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Abstract
There is a long tradition of thinking of thermodynamics, not as
a theory of fundamental physics (or even a candidate theory of fun-
damental physics), but as a theory of how manipulations of a physi-
cal system may be used to obtain desired effects, such as mechanical
work. On this view, the basic concepts of thermodynamics, heat and
work, and with them, the concept of entropy, are relative to a class
of envisaged manipulations. This view has been dismissed by many
philosophers of physics, in my opinion too hastily. This paper is a
sketch and defense of a science of manipulations and their effects on
physical systems. This is, I claim, the best way to make sense of ther-
modynamics as it is found in textbooks and as it is practiced. I call
this science thermo-dynamics (with hyphen), or Θ∆cs, for short, to
highlight that it may be different from the science of thermodynamics,
as the reader conceives it. Even if one is not convinced that it is the
best way to make sense of thermodynamics as it is practiced, it should
be non-controversial that Θ∆cs is a legitimate science. An upshot of
the discussion is a clarification of the roles of the Gibbs and von Neu-
mann entropies. Given the definition of statistical thermo-dynamic
entropy, it can be proven that, under the assumption of availability of
thermodynamically reversible processes, these functions are the unique
(up to an additive constant) functions that represent thermo-dynamic
entropy. Light is also shed on the use of coarse-grained entropies.
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1 Introduction
In what follows I will tell you about a science that I call thermo-
dynamics. Following the word of the Lord, when he first bestowed
that word upon us, I retain the hyphen, to emphasize the etymology
of the word: it is formed from the Greek works for heat and power.1
Following the word of the Laird, I will often abbreviate it as Θ∆cs (to
be pronounced “thermo-dynamics”), which also emphasizes its Greek
roots.2 The reason I emphasize the etymology is that the science of
thermo-dynamics has at its core a distinction between two modes of
energy transfer between physical systems: as heat, and as work.
The concepts of Θ∆cs are, I claim, the best way to make sense of
most of what is called “thermodynamics” in the textbooks, though
that content is often obscured in the presentation. Be warned, how-
ever: the scope of Θ∆cs is narrower than thermodynamics as it is
sometimes conceived. The scope of Θ∆cs includes the zeroth, first,
second, and (in the quantum context) third laws of thermodynamics,
all of which were designated laws of thermodynamics by 1914 at the
latest. It does not include a relative late-comer to the family of laws
of thermodynamics, which Brown and Uffink (2001) have dubbed the
Minus First Law, which, though it had long been identified as an im-
portant principle, was not called by anyone a law of thermodynamics
prior to the 1960s.3
A thermo-dynamic theory involves treating certain variables asma-
nipulable, in a sense that I will explain in the next section, and has to
do with the responses of physical systems to manipulations of those
1The word’s first appearance is in Part VI of Kelvin’s “On the Dynamical Theory of
Heat” (Thomson 1857, read before the Royal Society of Edinburgh on May 1, 1854). There
he recapitulates what in 1853 he had called the “Fundamental Principles in the Theory of
the Motive Power of Heat,” now re-labelled “Fundamental Principles of General Thermo-
dynamics.”
2Maxwell used this and related abbreviations in his correspondence with P. G. Tait.
See letter to Tait of Dec. 1, 1873, in Harman (1995, p. 947).
3The minus first law, which Brown and Uffink also call the Equilibrium Principle, is
given by them as,
An isolated system in an arbitrary initial state within a finite fixed volume will
spontaneously attain a unique state of equilibrium (Brown and Uffink, 2001,
p. 528).
They point out that a principle of this sort had been recognized as a law of thermodynamics
earlier, by Uhlenbeck and Ford (1963, p. 5).
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variables. A designation of certain variables as manipulable is not
something that appears in, or supervenes on, fundamental physics; it
must be added. For this reason, Θ∆cs is not and cannot be a compre-
hensive or fundamental physical theory. It is nonetheless a perfectly
respectable theory, a useful one, and, for beings such as us, who are not
transcendent intellects beholding the cosmos from outside but rather
agents embedded in the world and interacting with it, perhaps even
an indispensable theory. Confusion arises when it is mistaken for the
sort of theory that could possibly be a fundamental one. Indeed, I will
argue that some of the various puzzles and paradoxes that have arisen
from thermodynamics stem from confusing Θ∆cs with fundamental
physics.
The idea that thermodynamics should be thought of as a theory of
this sort is not new; see Appendix for a sampling of quotations from
the history of Θ∆cs. A conception of thermodynamics along these lines
is rapidly becoming the mainstream view among workers in quantum
thermodynamics, who view it as a species of resource theory, akin
to quantum information theory (see Goura et al. 2015; Goold et al.
2016; Ng and Woods 2018; Lostaglio 2019). This development has so
far attracted little attention from philosophers; a notable exception is
Wallace (2016).
I start by outlining the basic concepts needed to formulate Θ∆cs.
2 Exogenous and manipulable variables
In this section I highlight some routine features of scientific practice
that are so ubiquitous that for the most part we don’t really think
about them, and they are passed over without comment. It is worth-
while, however, to get clear about what’s going on.
Consider a sort of problem that is frequently found in textbooks
and in the scientific literature. One is asked to consider a system
subjected to an external force, or to an external potential, and to cal-
culate certain aspects of its behaviour (e.g. to solve the equations of
motion, or to find the energy eigenvalues), subject to that external
potential. The Hamiltonian for such a system consists of its internal
Hamiltonian, which includes the kinetic energies of its parts and terms
involving interactions, if any, between its parts, plus the external po-
tential.
H = Hint + Vext. (1)
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For the purposes of a problem like that, nothing needs to be said about
the source of the external potential. It is treated as given. Presumably,
the external potential is an interaction potential between the system
in question and some other system, but we are not asked to include
that system in our calculations, and, in particular, we do not consider
the effect of the system under consideration on the system that is the
source of the external potential. This is what it means to treat the
external potential as given.
I will call variables treated in this way exogenous variables. Note
that designation of a variable as exogenous has to do with how it is
handled in a given investigation; the distinction between exogenous
and other variables is not intrinsic to the physical nature of those
variables. The phrase “exogenous variable” should be taken as short
for “variable treated exogenously.” Were it not for the awkwardness
of language that would ensue, I would eschew adjectival uses of “ex-
ogenous” in favour of adverbial.
The same variable may be treated exogenously in one investigation,
and included as part of the system under consideration in another. An
an example consider the usual pedagogical entry into celestial mechan-
ics. First one treats of a body in a fixed external 1/r potential, and
shows that its trajectories take the form of conic sections (ellipses,
parabolas, or hyperbolas, depending on the energy), subject to the
area law with respect to the origin of coordinates. This yields a re-
spectable first approximation to planetary motion, as the gravitational
effect of the sun dominates the net force on any planet, and, to a first
approximation, the effect of the planet on the sun is negligible, and we
may treat the sun as fixed. The next step on the journey to celestial
mechanics is from the one-body to the two-body problem, in which
the sun’s position is treated as dynamical variable.
We find this distinction between exogenous and other variables
also in computer modelling of physical systems. Consider climate
models. Various aspects of the earth’s climate system are treated in
such a model, and their behaviour subjected to the dynamics written
into the model. Some variables, such as solar radiation and green-
house gas emissions from volcanoes and from anthropogenic sources,
are treated as inputs. No attempt is made to include solar dynamics
or the geophysics of volcano eruptions in the dynamics of the model.
When dealing with exogenous variables, there is often a range of
possible values to be considered, and we may be interested in the dif-
ferences that changes to the exogenous variable make to the behaviour
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of the system at hand. Crucially, we treat the exogenous variables as
ones that can vary independently of the states of the systems under
consideration—that is, they are treated as free variables. This is a
crucial aspect of controlled experiments. The systems under consid-
eration are subjected to a range of treatments, and a well-designed
experiment is one in which the treatments may be regarded as vary-
ing independently of the initial states of the systems to be studied.
Often some randomizing device is employed, which is thought of as
rendering its outputs effectively free for the purpose at hand.4
I will say that a variable is being treated as a manipulable vari-
able in a given theoretical investigation if (i) it is being treated as
exogenous variable, and (ii) there is a range of possible values, or,
perhaps, of possible alternative temporal evolutions of that variable,
under consideration.
One might be tempted to say that treatment of certain variables
as exogenous is a concession to our limited calculational and compu-
tational abilities. It might be better, one might think, to include in
our climate models solar dynamics, the dynamics of volcanoes, and
a sufficiently detailed model of human activities that anthropogenic
emissions could be included among the modelled variables. This would
be a mistake. For certain purposes, it is essential to treat certain vari-
ables as manipulable. These purposes include attribution studies. To
use climate models to estimate the contribution of various inputs to
observed global warming, researchers vary those inputs while holding
others fixed. It is investigations such as these that, in part, underwrite
conclusions that most, all, or perhaps more than all of the observed
warming can be attributed to anthropogenic greenhouse gases. And,
of course, this is relevant to policy decisions (or would be, if anyone
were making informed policy decisions); one can make projections by
modelling future climate under a variety of emissions scenarios.
All of this is, of course, meant to be consistent with the concept of
manipulability as it appears in the causal modelling literature (Pearl,
2000; Woodward, 2003, 2017).
When speaking of manipulable variables, and a set of alternative
manipulations, one almost inevitably begins to talk of choices of ma-
nipulations. This carries with it a suggestion that human agency is
central to the concept, which in turn raises the suspicion that sub-
jectivity is being brought in. This is not the case; a variable treated
4Borrowing the apt phrase of Bell (1977).
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as manipulable need not be manipulable by us (see above, re vol-
canoes). Nevertheless, some who have developed a conception very
close to what I am calling Θ∆cs have lapsed into talk that suggests
that its concepts are subjective. This is an error, in my view. It
stems, I think, from overextension of the familiar subjective/objective
dichotomy. Objective features of a physical system are supposed to
belong to that system, in and of itself; they are features that cannot
change without change of its physical state. The concepts of Θ∆cs are
relative to a specification of manipulable variables and a set of alter-
native manipulations of those variables, and as such are not there in
the physical states of things. It does not follow that they are sub-
jective, although, if all one had at hand was the objective/subjective
dichotomy, it is understandable that one might lapse into saying that
they are.
3 Thermo-dynamic theories
An equilibrium thermo-dynamic state of a system A may be specified
by its total internal energy E and the values of one or more manipula-
ble variables λ = {λ1, . . . , λn}. As a running example, you can think
of a gas confined to a container with a moveable piston, whose walls
are represented as an external potential that strongly repels mole-
cules that get too close. We consider a family of such potentials,
corresponding to different positions of the piston.
It is often assumed that, besides changes to the variables λ, there
are other manipulations that may be performed. For example, the
system A may be coupled to other systems regarded as heat reservoirs
at various temperatures. This coupling may be applied or removed;
that is, the interaction Hamiltonian between A and the heat reservoir
is being treated as a manipulable variable. A heat reservoir is a system
with which is associated a definite temperature, from which no work is
extracted and on which no work is done; its only exchanges of energy
with other systems are as heat. What it means to count a system
as a heat reservoir at a given temperature will be discussed a bit
more in the next section. Often, one imagines heat reservoirs available
for arbitrary temperatures. But one can also consider the thermo-
dynamic theory of an adiabatically isolated system, or a theory on
which there is access to only one heat reservoir, or some other limited
set.
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Corresponding to any manipulation is a transformation of the state
of the system. A small change dλi in one of the manipulable variables,
with the others held fixed, and no heat exchange, may result in a
change dE in the internal energy of the system. We define,
Ai(E,λ) =
∂E
∂λi
, (2)
where it is understood that the other variables are held fixed, and
there is no exchange of energy with any heat reservoir or anything
else. In standard thermodynamics, the quantities Ai are usually as-
sumed to have steady, time-independent values. We can take this
condition (which will be modified in section 5) as a criterion of ther-
mal equilibrium of the system. In any process involving a small change
in the variables λ, we define work done on the system as
d¯W =
∑
i
Ai dλi. (3)
The convention in play is that work done on the system, increasing
its energy, counts as positive. If the only other changes to the internal
energy of the system A are due to interactions with heat reservoirs,
we have a neat partitioning of any change in the energy of A into a
work component and a heat component. Changes in energy of A due
to changes in the manipulable variables counts as work; exchanges of
energy with heat reservoirs, as heat. As with work, we count heat
transfer into the system A as positive.
A thermo-dynamic theory consists of a system A, a class of Hamil-
tonians Hλ that depend on manipulable variables λ, and a set M
of possible manipulations of those variables. The class might include
manipulations that go beyond what can feasibly be achieved by us; we
can very well consider how a system would react to more fine-grained
manipulations than we can achieve, or to manipulations that proceed
so slowly that we would not have the patience to see them through.
What one needs to know about the effects of these manipulations is
given by the dependence of the generalized forces Ai on the values of
the parameters (E,λ) specifying the state. The structure of the set
of manipulations may vary from theory to theory. One thing that I
will assume in what follows is that manipulations can be composed:
if there is a manipulation that takes a state a to a state b, and a ma-
nipulation that takes a state b to a state c, these manipulations can
be performed in succession, forming a manipulation that takes state
a to b and then to c.
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We will not be assuming that thermodynamically reversible pro-
cesses, or even processes that approximate thermodynamic reversibil-
ity arbitrarily closely, are always available. Dropping the assumption
of the availability of reversible processes requires revision of the fa-
miliar framework of thermodynamics, as it means dropping the as-
sumption of the availability of an entropy function. In its place we
will define quantities SM(a → b), defined relative to a class of avail-
able manipulations M, to be thought of as analogues, in the current
context, of entropy difference between states a and b. These will be
representable as differences in the values of some state function only
in the limiting case in which all states can be connected reversibly.
For any two thermo-dynamic states a, b, let M(a→ b) be the set
of manipulations in M that lead from a to b. These may involve heat
exchanges with one or more heat reservoirs {Bi} with temperatures
Ti. For any manipulationM inM(a→ b), let Qi(a→ b)M be the heat
transferred over the course ofM into A from the reservoir Bi (positive
if there is energy flow from Bi to A, negative if there is energy flow
the other way). We define,
σM (a→ b) =
∑
i
Qi(a→ b)M
Ti
. (4)
We define, as analogues of entropies (which we will henceforth just
call “entropies”),5
SM(a→ b) = l.u.b. {σM (a→ b) |M ∈ M(a→ b)}. (5)
where “l.u.b.” stands for “least upper bound,” that is, the smallest
real number that is at least as large as all members of the set.6 Via the
obvious extension of this definition we also define quantities such as
SM(a→ b→ c) for processes with any number of intermediate steps.
It follows from the assumption about composition of manipulations
and the definition of the entropies that
SM(a→ b→ c) = SM(a→ b) + SM(b→ c), (6)
5The word, appropriately, is formed from the Greek ἡ τρωπὴ, transformation, for what
Clausius called the transformational content (Verwandlungsinhalt) of a body (Clausius,
1865, p. 390).
6If b cannot be reached from a via any manipulation in M, or if the set considered has
no upper bound, SM(a → b) is undefined. To avoid qualifying every formula involving
entropies with a proviso that all quantities mentioned therein are defined, we can, if we
like, allow SM(a → b) to take values in the extended reals, which supplement the reals
with ±∞. Then, if b cannot be reached from a, SM(a→ b) = −∞.
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and similarly for processes with longer chains of intermediate states.
One version of the second law of thermodynamics says that, if a
system undergoes a cyclic transformation, returning it to its original
state, the sum of Q/T over all heat exchanges in the process cannot
be positive. We can write this as:
The second law of thermo-dynamics. For any state a,
SM(a→ a) ≤ 0.
It follows from the second law that, for any states a, b,
SM(a→ b→ a) ≤ 0, (7)
and similarly for cycles consisting of larger numbers of states.
By the second law, SM(a → b → a) cannot exceed zero. If it is
equal to zero, then there is no harm in adding to the list of possible
manipulations a fictitious reversible process that can be run in either
direction, from a to b, or, with signs of heat exchanges reversed, from
b to a. We don’t expect any actual process to satisfy this condition;
as John Norton (2016) has emphasized, any process will involve some
dissipation of energy, and fail to be completely reversible. If one took
talk of reversible processes too literally, one would end up ascribing
absurd properties to them; they would be processes that take place
infinitely slowly and yet somehow manage to get completed. Norton
argues that talk of reversible processes should be regarded as short-
hand for talk of limiting properties of sets of actual processes. Our
definition of entropy makes this explicit.
In what follows, take the statement that a and b can be reversibly
connected as no more than a convenient way of saying that SM(a →
b → a) is equal to 0. On the macroscopic scale, it may be the case
that, for all a, b, SM(a→ b→ a) is close enough to zero that we can
neglect the fact that it is not exactly zero. In standard thermody-
namics, which is usually meant to apply at the macroscopic scale, it is
normally assumed that any two states of a system can be connected
by a reversible process. If this holds—that is, if, for all states a, b,
SM(a → b → a) = 0—it follows from the second law that there is
a function S on the set of thermodynamic states, defined up to an
additive constant, such that
SM(a→ b) = SM(b)− SM(a). (8)
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(Proof left as an exercise for the reader.) If, however, we want to push
Θ∆cs down to the nanoscale, on which departures from reversibility
are non-negligible, we need not assume this.
Call a transformation from a thermo-dynamic state a to a state b
adiabatic if no exchanges of energy occur that are not due to manipu-
lation of the variables λ; no heat is exchanged with any heat reservoir.
The following is a simple consequence of the definition of entropy.
Proposition 1. If there is a manipulation that takes state a to state
b adiabatically, then, for any state c, SM(b → c) ≤ SM(a → c) and
SM(c→ b) ≥ SM(c→ a).
In the special case in which all states are reversibly connectable,
this says that an adiabatic transformation cannot lower the entropy
of a state.
It’s a consequence of all this that, given a physical system A, there
may be several thermo-dynamical theories of that system A, depend-
ing on the specification of manipulable variables, and on the set M
of possible manipulations. This means that a pair of physical states
a, b of the system might be assigned different values of the entropy
SM(a → b) by different thermo-dynamic theories. This will be illus-
trated in the next section. If one thought that the entropy difference
of a pair of states of a system was supposed to be a property of those
physical states alone, this might seem paradoxical. In the context of
Θ∆cs, there’s nothing paradoxical about it at all.
Once the set M of possible manipulations is chosen, how the sys-
tem reacts to those manipulations is a matter of physics. These reac-
tions are encoded in the equilibrium values of the generalized forces Ai,
defined by (2). It is these that determine the dependence of entropies
SM(a→ b) on the values of the manipulable variables. One may say:
we may choose the variables to manipulate, but nature chooses the re-
sponse to those manipulations. It would be mistake to say that a view
of this sort makes entropy subjective. Entropy remains a measurable
quantity, but what quantity it is that is being measured is determined
by the choice of manipulable variables.
What we have presented in this section is almost the same as what
is found in typical thermodynamic textbooks. Almost. It is univer-
sally agreed that thermodynamic states are defined relative to some
selection of a set of variables that is small, compared to the full set of
variables needed to specify the precise physical state of a system. The
difference is that these variables are often described as themacroscopic
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variables, the ones whose values can be obtained via a macroscopic
measurement.
What to say about this? First: though this is not always explic-
itly said, if one reads any textbook of thermodynamics closely enough,
one will find that the extensive variables that define an equilibrium
state are invariably treated as manipulable variables, in the sense dis-
cussed in the previous section.7 Sometimes they are called external
variables. Second: it should be stressed that the selected variables are
not properties of the system to be studied, but of external constraints
placed on the system. For example, the quantity V that appears in
the equation of state of a gas is the volume available to the gas. Third:
even if there is a correspondence between manipulable variables and
macroscopic extensive variables (as there is a correspondence between
the position of the walls of a container and the volume occupied by a
gas in its equilibrium state), these are conceptually distinct. Fourth:
an equilibrium thermo-dynamic state need not be a state in which all
macroscopically observable quantities have stable values. Consider,
for example, a particle, visible under a microscope of modest power,
undergoing Brownian motion. If—as I think we should—we count its
position as macroscopically observable, this does not settle down to
a stable value. What we have, instead, is a stable pattern of fluctua-
tions. This can well count as a state of thermo-dynamic equilibrium.
4 Examples
Two examples will help illustrate how Θ∆cs works, and how it differs
from the standard way of presenting thermodynamics.
4.1 Entropy of mixing of gases
Consider the following example, discussed by Gibbs (1875, 227–229;
1906, 166-167), which has been the topic of considerable discussion
7Example, from one of the most widely used textbooks,
A description of a thermodynamic systems requires the specification of the
“walls” that separate it from its surroundings and that provide its boundary
conditions. It is by means of manipulations of the walls that the extensive
parameters of the system are altered and processes are initiated (Callen, 1985,
p. 15).
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since that time. We consider a container divided by a partition into
two subvolumes, each containing samples of gas at the same tempera-
ture and pressure. The partition is removed, and the gases interdiffuse,
until each is equally distributed within the whole volume. Has there
been an increase of entropy, or not?
The answer found in all the textbooks, given already by Gibbs, is
that if the gases initially in the two subvolumes are of the same type,
there has been no change of thermodynamic state, and ipso facto no
change in entropy. If the two subvolumes initially contain gases of
different types, initial and final states of the contents of the container
are distinct thermodynamic states, and the entropy of the final state
is higher than that of the initial state. This entropy increase is known
as the entropy of mixing.
But what is the criterion for sameness of thermodynamic state?
On the standard textbook account, thermodynamic states are defined
with respect to macroscopic variables. On this account, initial and
final states are distinct if and only if they macroscopically distin-
guishable. On the thermo-dynamic account, initial and final states
count as distinct only if the class M contains manipulations that act
differentially on the two gases, in such a way that their interdiffusion
represents a lost opportunity to extract work. A standard textbook
device, originating with Boltzmann (1878) and popularized by Planck
(1897, §236), involves conceiving of pistons made from some material
permeable to one gas but not the other. Armed with such pistons,
one could slowly expand one gas and then the other, keeping their
temperature constant as work is extracted by having them in contact
with a heat reservoir. In such a way one obtains the standard entropy
of mixing, which is just the sum of the entropies of expansion of the
two gases.
One could imagine cases in which the initial and final states are
macroscopically distinct but not thermo-dynamically distinct. They
could, for example, differ in colour. If the class of manipulations
considered does not include any way to exploit this difference to dif-
ferentially manipulate them, then initial and final states will not, for
that thermo-dynamic theory, be distinct thermo-dynamic states. Ini-
tial and final states could also be thermo-dynamically distinct but not
macroscopically distinguishable via the sorts of operations we usually
count as macroscopic observations. They might appear the same to
our measuring apparatus, and still react differently to the aforemen-
tioned semi-permeable pistons.
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As a historical note: conflation of these two notions of thermody-
namic state goes back as far as Gibbs’ discussion, as Gibbs gives both
answers to the question of criterion of distinctness of initial and final
states. He first gives, as a criterion for restoring the initial state of the
gases, the condition that we bring about a state “undistinguishable
from the previous one in its sensible properties” (1875, p. 228; 1906,
p. 166). “It is to states of systems thus incompletely defined,” he
says, “that the problems of thermodynamics relate.” But then, in the
following paragraph, he writes,
We might also imagine the case of two gases which should
be absolutely identical in all the properties (sensible and
molecular) which come into play while they exist as gases
either pure or mixed with each other, but which should dif-
fer in respect to the attractions between their atoms and
the atoms of some other substances, and therefore in their
tendency to combine with other substances. In the mixture
of such gases by diffusion an increase of entropy would take
place, although the process of mixture, dynamically consid-
ered, might be absolutely identical in its minutest details
(even with respect to the precise path of each atom) with
processes which might take place without any increase of
entropy. In such respects, entropy stands strongly con-
trasted with energy. (Gibbs 1875, pp. 228–229; 1906, p.
167)
Here he seems to be acknowledging that the key issue is not whether
the two gases are the same in their sensible properties, but whether
or not they can be separated by external means.
This example has given rise to metaphysical discussions that are
completely irrelevant. The relevant criterion of distinctness, it is said
in some quarters, is whether the particles of the two gases are identical
in a strong sense, according to which exchange of particles makes no
difference whatsoever to the physical state. On such a view, if all the
particles were distinct—that is, if every particle involved differed in
some physical property from all the others—then there would always
be an entropy of mixing when the barrier was removed. As Robert
Swendsen (2006; 2018) has argued, this gives the wrong answer when
applied to a colloidal suspension. A colloid, such as paint, or milk,
consists of blobs, called colloidal particles, of some type of material
suspended in some fluid. The colloidal particles may be large enough
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that each contains a large number of molecules, and, though their sizes
may be sufficiently uniform that we are justified in treating the colloid
as a collection of identical particles, it might be that no two of them
contain exactly the same number of atoms. Someone committed to
the position that for a collection of distinct particles there is always an
entropy of mixing when a partition is removed would be committed to
the position that we can lower and raise the entropy of a can of paint
merely by inserting or removing a partition. This is the wrong answer.
In the absence of any means of manipulation that is so sensitive to
the minute differences between colloidal particles that each particle
can be differentially manipulated, there is no entropy of mixing when
one removes a partition separating two samples of the same type of
paint.
The entropy of mixing of two distinct gases depends only on the
quantities of gas in each subvolume, and on their initial and final
volumes. It is independent of the degree of dissimilarity. This struck
Duhem (1892) as paradoxical, and, following him, Wiedeberg (1894),
who spoke of “Gibbs’ paradox.” The alleged paradox stems from a
tension between the independence of the entropy of mixing from the
nature of the gases (as long as they are distinct), and the idea that a
result valid for identical gases should be obtainable as a limit-case of
distinct gases of diminishing degree of dissimilarity.
If entropy is thought of as an intrinsic property of a system, like
its mass or its total energy, then this does seem puzzling. However,
as argued by Denbigh and Redhead (1983), if we recall how entropy is
defined—relative to some set of processes, as a limit of some quantity
taken over all processes in that set—this does not seem surprising
at all. The result of any particular process, taking placing within a
fixed duration of time, may well depend continuously on the relevant
parameters of the system. But entropy involves a limit over a set
of processes. As two gases become more and more similar, the time
required to achieve a given degree of separation may increase, but, if
our set of manipulations contains arbitrarily slow processes, this will
not affect entropy as a limit property.
An analogy may help. Consider a collection of immortal ants that
crawl at different rates towards a hill that is one metre tall. All of
them, as long as they have a nonzero velocity in the proper direction,
eventually reach the top of the hill. The distance crawled, and height
reached, at any given time t, is a continuous function of the speed at
which the ant crawls. But the maximum height reached by an ant is
15
one metre for any nonzero speed, and zero for a stationary ant, and
so is a discontinuous function of the ant’s speed.
4.2 Helmholtz free energy
Suppose that the class of manipulations to be considered involves ac-
cess to only one heat reservoir, at temperature T . We ask: if the
system starts out in a state a and ends up in state b, what is the most
work that you can extract from it along the way?
Let Ea and Eb be the internal energy of the system in states a and
b, respectively. If work is extracted from the system, this means that
W is negative. We obtain from the system a positive amount of work
Wgain = −W . Conservation of energy requires,
Eb − Ea = Q−Wgain. (9)
From the definition of entropy SM(a→ b),
SM(a→ b) ≥
Q
T
, (10)
and so
Wgain ≤ −(Eb − Ea − TSM(a→ b)). (11)
If the quantity on the right-hand side of (11) is negative, then no work
can be obtained in a transition from a to b using a heat reservoir at
temperature T as a resource; on the contrary, the transition requires
expenditure of a quantity of work (that is, a positive quantity of energy
going into the system),
Wcost ≥ Eb − Ea − TSM(a→ b). (12)
Call the quantity
FM(a→ b) = Eb − Ea − TSM(a→ b) (13)
the Helmholtz free energy of b relative to a. If the only available heat
sources and sinks are at temperature T , a transition from a to b is
achievable without expenditure of a positive quantity of work if and
only if FM(a→ b) < 0.
Let us now make the assumption that all states are reversibly con-
nectible, and hence that there is a state-function S available, such that
SM(a→ b) = SM(b)− SM(a). This allows us to define a function
FM = E − TSM (14)
16
such that
FM(a→ b) = FM(b)− FM(a). (15)
The quantity FM was called the available energy in the 4th edition
(1875), and subsequent editions, of Maxwell’s Theory of Heat (pp.
187–192). It was called freie Energie by Hemholtz (1882), whence its
current name, Helmholtz free energy. If all heat exchanges are with
reservoirs at temperature T , then a transition from a to b requires
work to be done if FM(b) > FM(a), and can be a source of work if
FM(b) < FM(a).
There is an interesting difference between the uses of this concept
by Maxwell and Helmholtz, respectively. Helmholtz imagines a system
in contact with a heat bath at temperature T . All changes under
such conditions are isothermal changes, and the free energy difference
between two states is the work needed to effect a state transition
via an isothermal process. The use of the concept is to determine the
equilibrium state of the system, which is the state in which F takes its
minimum value (that is, work has to be done to move the system away
from this state). This is the use to which it is put in most modern
textbooks. This presentation may suggest that the Helmholtz free
energy is a property of the system itself.
Maxwell, on the other hand, imagines transitions between arbi-
trary initial and final states; these need not be states of temperature
T . The change in available energy is the work needed to effect a state
transition, using a heat reservoir at temperature T as a resource. On
this way of thinking about it, F is a function both of the state of the
system, via state functions E and S, and of the heat reservoir, via T .
5 Statistical thermo-dynamics
In the previous section it was assumed that the equilibrium values of
the quantities {Ai}, defined by eq. (2), are well-defined as functions
of the energy E and the manipulable variables λ.
That this is a substantive assumption can be seen by considering
the example of a gas confined to a container with a moveable piston
whose position is taken to be manipulable. The generalized force cor-
responding to displacements of the piston is the negative of the pres-
sure. For a macroscopic gas in equilibrium, we expect an even and
steady pressure on the walls of the container. If we think about what
is happening on the molecular level, we realize that this is a statistical
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regularity of the same sort as the observed near-constancy of deaths
per capita in a given population from year to year, a regularity aris-
ing from aggregation of a large number of individually unpredictable
events. A regularity of this sort is not to be thought of as something
that occurs with certainty, but, rather, with high probability. If we
ask whether we could push on the piston and find ourselves able to di-
minish the volume with virtually no resistance, we have to admit that
it is not impossible, but (for a macroscopic gas) so highly improbable
that the possibility may be neglected.
This means that probabilistic considerations are in play, even in
the cases where there is a determinate (enough) near-certain amount
of work required for a given manipulation. The role of probability
may be left implicit in cases where deviation from certainty is negligi-
ble. However, since probability is playing a role whether explicitly ac-
knowledged or not, it is best to introduce probabilistic considerations
explicitly. This opens up the possibility of a more general theory that
embraces cases in which statistical fluctuations in generalized forces
are non-negligible, with the quasi-deterministic macroscopic theory as
a limiting case.
It is a commonplace of the literature on philosophy of probability
that the word “probability” is used in more than one sense. That
raises the question of what probability is to mean in this context.
I will defer that question (but see Myrvold 2016 for some options),
leaving a gap in the account to be filled in. As long as the usual
machinery of probability theory is applicable, the conclusions we will
draw will be independent of how that gap is filled.
One thing should be stressed, however. In the latter half of the
nineteenth century, it became increasingly common (spurred, in part
by Venn’s The Logic of Chance) to think of probability statements
as involving veiled reference to frequencies in some actual or hypo-
thetical series of similar events. It was in this milieu that Boltzmann
(1871, 1898), and, following him, Maxwell (1879) and Gibbs (1902),
began to think in terms of an imaginary ensemble consisting of a large
number of systems with the same external parameters and varying
microstates. Frequentism is widely (and rightly, in my opinion) re-
jected in the literature on the philosophy of probability. Fortunately,
nothing in the approach of Boltzmann and his successors is wedded
to it. Any readers who have qualms about talk of probabilities stem-
ming from a worry that probabilities cannot be ascribed to individual
systems should rest assured that this is not the case. There is no com-
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mitment to frequentism about probabilities. Feel free to take the talk
of ensembles by Boltzmann, Maxwell, Gibbs, and the textbook tradi-
tion that followed as a picturesque way of talking about a probability
distribution applied to propositions about an individual system.
Given a thermo-dynamic state of a system, we want to have proba-
bility distributions over the work done and heat exchanged as a result
of a manipulation. The reason that these don’t have determinate
values is that the thermo-dynamic state of a system drastically un-
derspecifies the physical state of the system. This suggests that we
supplement our specification of a thermo-dynamic state, which so far
involves specification of the internal energy and of values of the ma-
nipulable variables, with a specification of a probability distribution
over possible physical states of the system. This can be done in the
context of classical or quantum mechanics. In a classical context, we
will have assignments of probabilities to appropriate subsets of the sys-
tem’s phase space; in the quantum context, probability distributions
over the pure states of the system.
What now happens to the second law of thermodynamics? In a
regime in which statistical fluctuations of the force on a piston are non-
negligible, we might in a given cycle of an engine end up expending less
work than expected in the compression stage, and hence might obtain
in that cycle more work than the Carnot limit. But, by the same
token, we might expend more work than expected. We expect that
we won’t be able to consistently and reliably violate the Carnot limit
on efficiency. This suggests a probabilistic version on the second law,
expressed in terms of expectation values of heat and work transfers.
The second law will then be, to employ Szilard’s vivid analogy, like
a theorem about the impossibility of a gambling system intended to
beat the odds set by a casino.
Consider somebody playing a thermodynamical gamble with
the help of cyclic processes and with the intention of de-
creasing the entropy of the heat reservoirs. Nature will deal
with him like a well established casino, in which it is pos-
sible to make an occasional win but for which no system
exists ensuring the gambler a profit (Szilard 1972, p. 73,
from Szilard 1925, p. 757).
We will be considering exchanges of energy with heat reservoirs.
A heat reservoir is a system from which no work is extracted and on
which no work is done; its only exchanges of energy with other sys-
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tems are as heat. When two heat reservoirs of the same temperature
are placed in thermal contact, there is no tendency for heat to be
transferred in either direction, and the expectation value of the heat
exchange is zero. When two reservoirs are placed in thermal contact,
the expectation value of heat flow is from warmer to cooler. Any col-
lection of heat reservoirs at the same temperature may be regarded as
a larger heat reservoir at the same temperature.
From considerations of this sort one can argue (see Maroney 2007
for exposition) that an appropriate probability distribution to asso-
ciate with a heat reservoir is the one that Gibbs labelled the canonical
distribution. In the classical context, it is defined as the distribution
with density function, with respect to Liouville measure,
τβ(x) = Z
−1e−βH(x), (16)
where β is the inverse temperature 1/kT , and Z is the normalization
constant required to make the integral of this density over all phase
space unity. This depends both on the Hamiltonian H and on β, and
is called the partition function. In the quantum context, the canonical
distribution is represented by a density operator,
τˆβ = Z
−1e−βHˆ , (17)
where, again, Z is the constant required to normalize the state. We
will henceforth take it that to treat a system as a heat reservoir is to
represent its thermo-dynamic state by a canonical distribution, uncor-
related with the rest of the world.
6 Statistical-mechanical entropies, and
the second law
In the spirit of Szilard’s analogy, if we seek a statistical-mechanical
analog of the thermo-dynamic entropy, we may take the definition (5)
and replace the heat exchanges mentioned therein with their expecta-
tion values.
A thermo-dynamical state of a system will be specified by its
Hamiltonian H, which depends on manipulable variables λ, together
with a probability distribution over its state space. In the classical
context the probability distribution may be represented by a density
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function ρ; in the quantum context, the salient aspects of such a distri-
bution may be represented by a density operation ρˆ. Given a thermo-
dynamical state a = (ρa,Ha), we consider the effects of some manip-
ulation, which may consist of manipulation of the variables λ and of
couplings to various heat reservoirs {Bi}. The probability distribution
for A, together with canonical distributions for the heat reservoirs, de-
termines an initial probability distribution over the composite system
consisting of A and the reservoirs {Bi}. This will evolve, in accordance
with the Liouville equation (classical) or Schro¨dinger equation (quan-
tum), according to the Hamiltonian of the total system, which may be
changing due to the changes in the manipulable variables. This pro-
cess will result in a new thermo-dynamic state b = (ρb,Hb). Over the
course of the process quantities {Qi(a→ b)} of heat may be exchanged
with the reservoirs; the probability distribution over initial conditions,
together with the evolution of the joint system, yields a probability
distribution over the heats {Qi(a→ b)} . Let 〈Qi(a→ b)〉M be the ex-
pectation value of the heat obtained from reservoir Bi over the course
of the process. As before, let M(a → b) be the set of manipulations
in M that lead from a to b. For any manipulation M in M(a → b),
define
σM (a→ b) =
∑
i
〈Qi(a→ b)〉M
Ti
. (18)
Define the statistical-mechanical entropy SM(a→ b) by
SM(a→ b) = l.u.b.{σM (a→ b) |M ∈ M(a→ b)}. (19)
We are entitled to use the same notation for this and the entropies as
defined in section 3, as the latter are really only a special case of the
entropy defined here, when the probabilities are such that variance in
the heat exchanges are negligible. We are only making explicit the
previously implicit dependence on probabilistic considerations.
With these definitions in hand, the statistical-mechanical entropies
SM(a→ b) are defined once we have specified a class of manipulations.
Of particular interest will be classes of manipulations of the following
sort.
• At time t0, the heat reservoirs Bi have canonical distributions
at temperatures Ti, uncorrelated with A, and are not interacting
with A.
• During the time interval [t0, t1], the composite system consisting
of A and the reservoirs {Bi} undergoes Hamiltonian evolution,
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governed by a time-dependent Hamiltonian H(t), which may in-
clude successive couplings between A and the heat reservoirs
{Bi}.
• The internal Hamiltonians of the reservoirs {Bi} do not change.
• At time t1, the Hamiltonian of the system A is Hb, and, as a
result of Hamiltonian evolution of the composite system, the
marginal probability distribution of A is ρb.
The initial state of A is arbitrary. No assumption is made about the
form of the Hamiltonian HA, the nature of the manipulable variables
λ, or about the manipulations applied to them. These could very
well include fine-grained manipulations at the molecular level that we
would regard as well beyond the range of feasibility. In what fol-
lows, we will use Mθ to designate some class of this sort. That is,
the variable M ranges over arbitrary classes of manipulations, and
the variable Mθ ranges over classes of manipulations satisfying these
conditions.
A class of manipulations of this sort has the advantage that it
affords a clear distinction between energy changes of the system A
that are to be counted as work, and those that are to be counted as
heat. Changes in energy of A due to manipulation of the exogenous
variables are work; exchanges of energy with the heat reservoirs are
counted as heat. A more general class of manipulations might include
exchanges of energy between the system A and other systems that
are not treated as heat reservoirs—that is, systems with distributions
other than canonical distributions. With respect to this class of ma-
nipulations, we might not have a neat partition of energy changes to
A into heat and work; changes due to interactions with other systems
might be classed as neither.
Given some such class of manipulations, the second law comes out
as a theorem. That is, it can be proven that
SMθ(a→ a) ≤ 0. (20)
As we saw in section 3, it follows from this that if all states are re-
versibly connectable—that is, if, for all a, b,
SMθ(a→ b→ a) = 0, (21)
then there is a state function SMθ , defined up to an arbitrary constant,
such that
SMθ(a→ b) = SMθ(b)− SMθ(a). (22)
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If we ask what form that state-function takes, it turns out that, in the
classical context, it is the quantity called the Gibbs entropy, and, in
the quantum context, the von Neumann entropy.
To show this, we must first define these quantities. Consider a
probability distribution P on a classical state-space Γ, that has density
ρ with respect to Liouville measure. ρ itself may be treated as a
random variable: if a point x in Γ is randomly selected according to the
distribution P , there will be a corresponding value of ρ(x). Similarly,
any measurable function of ρ may be treated as a random variable.
We define the Gibbs entropy of the distribution P as proportional to
the expectation value, calculate with respect to P , of the logarithm of
ρ.
SG[ρ] = −k〈log ρ〉P (23)
For a quantum state, represented by a density operator ρˆ, we define
the von Neumann entropy,
SvN [ρˆ] = −k〈log ρˆ〉ρˆ = −kTr[ρˆ log ρˆ]. (24)
Most of what we will have to say applies equally in the classical and
quantum contexts. In what follows, we will use the intentionally am-
biguous notation S[ρ] to state results that hold both for Gibbs entropy
of a probability distribution on a classical phase space and for von
Neumann entropy of a quantum state.
The link between these quantities and the statistical thermo-dynamic
entropy is provided by the following theorem.
Proposition 2. 8 For any manipulation in the class Mθ,
∑
i
〈Qi〉
Ti
≤ S[ρA(t1)]− S[ρA(t0)].
Recalling the definition (19) of statistical-mechanical entropies,
this gives us,
Proposition 3. Statistical entropies defined with respect to Mθ sat-
isfy
SMθ(a→ b) ≤ S[ρb]− S[ρa].
8The classical version of this is found in Gibbs (1902, pp. 160–164), and the quantum
version, in Tolman (1938, §128–130).
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Though not a difficult theorem, Proposition 2 is of sufficient im-
portance that it may be called the Fundamental Theorem of Statistical
Thermo-dynamics. To get a feel for what it means, consider a heat en-
gine operating in a cycle between a hot heat reservoir at temperature
Th and a cooler heat sink at temperature Tc. It extracts a positive
amount of heat Qh from the hot reservoir, performs work W , and dis-
cards a positive amount Qh−W into the sink. To say that it operates
in a cycle means that its initial thermo-dynamic state is restored at
the end of this process (it may have built up some correlations with
the reservoirs along the way, but these don’t matter; the final state is
specified by the restriction of the joint probability distribution to the
system A). Proposition 2 tells us that the expectation values of work
obtained, heat extracted and heat discarded satisfy (recalling that a
quantity of heat counts as positive if it is going into the engine and
negative if it is going out),
〈Qh〉
Th
−
〈Qh〉 − 〈W 〉
Tc
≤ 0. (25)
This gives us, for the expectation value of the work obtained:
〈W 〉 ≤
(
1−
Tc
Th
)
〈Qh〉. (26)
Thus, the Carnot bound on the efficiency of a cyclical engine operating
between these two reservoirs becomes a bound on expectation value of
work obtained. It should be stressed that we have not presumed that
the actual values of heat exchanges will be or even will probably be
close to their expectation values. No assumption has been made that
the probability distributions for these quantities are tightly focussed
near the expectation values. These expectation values satisfy the given
relations even if the variance of their distributions is large.
From Proposition 3 the second law of thermo-dynamics is an im-
mediate corollary.
Corollary 3.1. For manipulations Mθ,
SMθ(a→ a) ≤ 0
for any thermo-dynamic state a.
Another immediate corollary of Proposition 3 is,
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Corollary 3.2. If SMθ(a→ b→ a) = 0, then
SMθ(a→ b) = S[ρb]− S[ρa].
Thus, the state function whose existence is guaranteed by the sec-
ond law plus reversibility is, up to an additive constant, the Gibbs or
von Neumann entropy.9
A probability distribution may encode a lot of details about the
microstate of the system that are irrelevant to the results of available
manipulations. Consider, for example, a gas consisting of a macro-
scopic number of molecules initially confined to the left side of a con-
tainer. A partition is removed, and the gas is allowed to expand freely
into the whole volume of the container. Imagine (as is common in the
literature on the philosophy of statistical mechanics) that it can do
so while isolated from its environment. Any probability distribution
with support in the set of states in which all molecules are one side
will evolve into a distribution with support on a set that is a minus-
cule fraction of the available phase space. However, this set will so
finely distributed that only very fine-grained manipulations could dis-
tinguish this probability distribution from an equilibrium distribution
uniform in the accessible region of phase space. If the only available
manipulations involve pistons and couplings to heat reservoirs, there
will be no difference, in terms of expected reactions to these manipu-
lations, between a probability distribution corresponding to a recent
isolated expansion from one side of the box and one on which the gas
had been in equilibrium with a heat reservoir for a long time. The
considerable knowledge about the state of the gas that comes from
knowing it was in the left half of the box an hour ago is irrelevant to
results of ham-handed interventions.
With these considerations in minds, we define an equivalence-
relation between thermo-dynamic states.
Any two thermo-dynamic states (ρ,Hλ), (ρ
′,Hλ) having
the same values of the manipulable variables λ, are thermo-
dynamically equivalent with respect to M if and only if,
for every manipulation M ∈ M, ρ and ρ′ yield the same
expectation values for work, 〈W 〉, and for heat exchanges,
〈Qi〉, over the course of the manipulationM . We will write
a ∼M a
′ for thermo-dynamic equivalence.
9It should be stressed that we are not defining the statistical mechanical entropy
SM(a→ b) in terms of S[ρb] and S[ρa]; it is defined by (19).
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We could, of course, define a stronger notion on which equivalence
requires, not just equality of expectation values, but equality of the
probability distributions for work and heat, but at the moment I see
no need for this. One could also relax the condition a bit, and require,
not exact equality, but equality within a certain tolerance (in which
case the relation will not be strictly speaking an equivalence relation).
Define coarse-grained entropies,
S¯M[a] = l.u.b {S[a
′] | a ∼M a
′}. (27)
Obviously, for any state a,
S¯M[a] ≥ S[a]. (28)
If, for some thermo-dynamic state a, there is another state a′ that is
thermo-dynamically equivalent to it and which maximizes the entropy
among states equivalent to a, we will say that a′ is a coarse-graining
of a. We will say that a is a coarse-grained state if and only if S¯M[a] =
S[a]. Note, however, that the coarse-grained entropy is well-defined
whether or not for every state there is a corresponding coarse-grained
state.
With the concept of coarse-grained entropy in hand, we have a
strengthening of Proposition 3.
Proposition 4. For any class of manipulations Mθ, and any pair of
thermo-dynamic states a, b,
SMθ(a→ b) ≤ S[ρb]− S¯Mθ [ρa].
The upper bound on SMθ(a → b) in Proposition 4 is a differ-
ence between two different state-functions, S and S¯Mθ , depending on
whether the state is the initial or final state of the manipulation. We
may call S¯Mθ the departure entropy, and S, the arrival entropy.
This sheds light on a move that has routinely been made, since the
time of Gibbs: the use of a coarse-grained entropy (usually obtained
via a coarse-graining of the state) to track approach to equilibrium of
an isolated system. If a system is isolated, the Gibbs/von Neumann
entropy is a constant of the motion. The state can, however, evolve
into a state in which the result of any manipulation would be the same
as would obtain if the state were one with a higher entropy S¯Mθ . The
quantity S¯Mθ , rather than S, is the one relevant to bounds on the
value of the state for obtaining work, and so is the relevant quantity
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to track, if one is interested in tracking loss of such value as the system
approaches equilibrium. This is not, as some have suggested, an ad
hoc move that is made for the sole purpose of finding a quantity that
increases on the way to equilibrium.
From the second law, Corollary 3.1, for any a, b, SMθ(a→ b→ a)
cannot be positive. It follows from Proposition (4) that the difference
between the Gibbs/von Neumann entropies of the states a and b, and
the corresponding coarse-grained versions, puts a bound on how close
to zero SMθ(a→ b→ a) can be.
Corollary 4.1.
−SMθ(a→ b→ a) ≥
(
S¯Mθ(ρa)− S[ρa]
)
+
(
S¯Mθ(ρb)− S[ρb]
)
.
An immediate consequence of this is that only coarse-grained states
can be reversibly connected.
Corollary 4.2. If SMθ(a → b → a) = 0, then S¯Mθ [a] = S[a] and
S¯Mθ [b] = S[b].
We can summarize the relations between the thermo-dynamic en-
tropies SMθ(a→ b) and the Gibbs/von Neumann entropies as follows.
1. If the states a and b can be connected reversibly, then the thermo-
dynamic entropy SMθ(a → b) is equal to the difference of the
Gibbs/von Neumann entropies of the two states. That is,
SMθ(a→ b) = S[ρb]− S[ρa].
This is not an arbitrary or whimsical choice, but a theorem.
2. This relation between thermo-dynamic entropy and the Gibbs/von
Neumann entropy can hold for both SMθ(a→ b) and SMθ(b →
a) only if a and b can be connected reversibly. If they cannot,
then either SMθ(a → b) is strictly less than S[ρb] − S[ρa], or
SMθ(b→ a) is strictly less than S[ρa]− S[ρb] (or both).
3. If a is not a coarse-grained state, then SMθ(a→ b) is never equal
to S[b]− S[a] for any state b that can be reached from a, but is
always strictly less.
To get a feel for this, suppose that a and b can be connected
adiabatically, that is, purely Hamiltonian evolution can take ρa to ρb.
One can think of free expansion of an adiabatically isolated gas; ρb
is then distribution that has support on a small but highly fibrillated
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set that is stretched out throughout the available phase space. Then,
because Hamiltonian evolution preserves S, S[ρb] is equal to S[ρa]. It
would simply be a gross error to conclude from this that a and b are
entropically on a par, and that, for some state c that can be reached
from both, SM(a → c) is equal to SM(b → c). Unless the expansion
can be undone adiabatically (which would require fantastically fine-
grained control over the evolution of the system), SM(b→ c) is strictly
less than SM(a→ c).
7 Dissipation
In any process M that takes a state a to a state b, some of the work
done, or heat discarded into a reservoir, may be recovered by some
process that takes b back to a. If the process can be reversed with the
signs of all 〈Qi〉 reversed, then full recovery is possible. If full recovery
is not possible, and cannot even be approached arbitrarily closely, we
will say that the process is dissipatory. A manipulation M ′ that takes
b to a and recovers work done and heat discarded would be one such
that
σM (a→ b) + σM ′(b→ a) = 0. (29)
There might be a limit to how closely this can be approached. Define
the dissipation associated with the process of M taking a to b as the
distance between this limit and perfect recovery.
δM (a→ b) = g.l.b.{−(σM (a→ b) + σM ′(b→ a)) |M
′ ∈ M(b→ a)}
= −SM(b→ a)− σM (a→ b). (30)
It follows from the second law that this is non-negative.
If there is no limit to how much the dissipation associated with
processes that connect a to b can be diminished, SM(a → b → a) is
equal to zero. This is the condition that we earlier called reversibility.
It is easy to see that the negative of this places a bound on the minimal
dissipation associated with any manipulation that takes a to b. For
any M in M(A→ b),
δM(a→ b) ≥ −SM(a→ b→ a). (31)
It follows from this and Corollary 4.1 that the difference between the
coarse-grained and non-coarse grained versions of the Gibbs/von Neu-
mann entropies of the states a and b place bounds on the minimal
dissipation associate with a process that takes a to b.
28
Corollary 4.3. For any states a, b, and any manipulation M in Mθ,
δM (a→ b) ≥
(
S¯Mθ(ρa)− S[ρa]
)
+
(
S¯Mθ(ρb)− S[ρb]
)
.
8 Demonology
As noted above, in Proposition 1, no adiabatic transformation can
decrease the entropy of a state. This is a consequence of the definition
of the entropies SM(a→ b). One could also consider transformations
of a system A that involve manipulation of A and an auxiliary system
C that can couple to it. No adiabatic transformation can decrease the
entropy of the joint system AC.
These entropies are, of course, defined relative to a class of ma-
nipulations. This dependence of the question of whether a given pro-
cess involves an atio increase of entropy on the class of manipulations
considered was illustrated by Maxwell via a thought experiment, in
which we imagine a “very observant and neat-fingered being”10 ca-
pable of performing manipulations that are “at present impossible to
us” (Maxwell, 1871, p. 308).
Suppose we have a class M of manipulations, and supplement it
with some manipulation not in the class, to form a new class M+.
It could happen that some state-transformation effected adiabatically
via manipulations in M+ could lower the entropy of a state, relative
to M. That is, there might be an adiabatic transformation a →
b, achievable via manipulations in M+, such that, for some state c,
SM(b→ c) > SM(a→ c). Someone confused about the dependence of
entropy on a set of manipulations might take this to be a violation of
the principles of thermo-dynamics, which dictate that, if an adiabatic
process can take a to b, SM(b → c) ≤ SM(a → c). There is no such
violation, because SM+(b→ c) ≤ SM+(a→ c).
This can be vividly illustrated by imagining a stock M of physi-
cally possible manipulations to be supplemented by a magical instan-
taneous velocity-reversing operation, yielding an enhanced set M+.
Consider our stock example of a container of gas, and let M be the
usual sorts of manipulations, consisting of manipulations of the posi-
tion of the piston and heat exchanges with various heat reservoirs. Let
M+ be this stock of operations, supplemented by a magical velocity-
reversal. Consider a container of gas initially confined to a subvolume,
10Letter to P. G. Tait, 11 Dec. 1867, in Harman (1995, p. 332).
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which expands to fill the whole container. With respect to M, this
expansion counts as an entropy increase. An irreversible expansion is
a lost opportunity to obtain work. But, since, with respect to M+,
the expansion is adiabatically reversible, there is no entropy increase,
no lost opportunity to obtain work, as one can apply the reversal op-
eration and wait for the gas to return to its original subvolume. An
application of the velocity reversal operation to the expanded gas re-
sults in an entropy decrease with respect toM but notM+. Since the
operation preserves phase-space volume (or, in the quantum context,
the absolute value of the inner product of any two state-vectors), the
proof of Proposition 2 still goes through, and the statistical version of
the second law holds even for the setM+ of manipulations. A demon
capable of performing a velocity reversal could undo the process of
equilibration, but could not operate an engine in a cycle to violate the
Carnot bound on efficiency of a heat engine.
This may seem paradoxical to some. Surely, it will be said, a gas
that is initially spread out throughout a container and subsequently
retreats to a corner must be decreasing its entropy. This cannot be
sustained, however, if one attends to the definition of thermodynamic
entropy. If the expansion of a gas can be can be reversed adiabatically,
then, by the definition of thermodynamic entropy—not just the defi-
nition we have given but by the definitions found in all textbooks of
thermodynamics—it is not an entropy-increasing process. The process
of returning to the initial subvolume may be a diminution of Boltz-
mann entropy, but this only illustrates that the connection between
Boltzmann entropy and thermodynamic entropy is somewhat tenuous.
Earman and Norton (1998) distinguish between straight and em-
bellished violations of the second law of thermodynamics. A straight
violation decreases the entropy of an adiabatically isolated system,
without compensatory increase of entropy elsewhere. An embellished
violation exploits such decreases in entropy reliably to provide work.
In a similar vein, David Wallace (2018) distinguishes between two
types of demon. Adapting the distinction to our terminology, a demon
of the first kind decreases entropy defined with respect to some class
M of manipulations, by utilizing a manipulation outside the class. A
demon of the second kind violates the Carnot bound on efficiency of
a heat engine over a cycle that restores the state of the demon plus
any auxiliary system utilized to its original thermo-dynamic state. By
Proposition 2, a demon of the second kind cannot exist without a de-
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parture from Hamiltonian dynamics.11 A demon of the first kind only
illustrates the dependency of entropy on the class of manipulations
considered.
Maxwell’s purpose in introducing the demon was to illustrate the
dependence of thermodynamic concepts on the class of manipulations
considered. He was quite explicit about what the point of the thought-
experiment was: to emphasize the built-in limitation of conclusions
drawn from standard thermodynamics to situations in which bodies
consisting of a large number of molecules are dealt with in bulk. These
conclusions, he says, may be found to be inapplicable to situations
involving manipulation of individual molecules (Maxwell, 1871, pp.
308–309). Despite this, the point, a fairly simple one, has been widely
misunderstood, resulting in a vast and largely confused literature on
the physical possibility or impossibility of a Maxwell demon.
9 Temporal asymmetry, and thermal-
ization
The Fundamental Theorem of Statistical Thermo-dynamics, Proposi-
tion 2, follows from elementary properties of the Gibbs and von Neu-
mann entropies and of Hamiltonian evolution. It is not temporally
symmetric. We consider a transformation that takes state a into state
b, and the order matters, because the right hand side of the inequal-
ity displayed is not invariant under interchange of a and b. No such
asymmetry is present in the underlying dynamics. Where, then, does
the temporal asymmetry come in?
The mathematical result on which the Fundamental Theorem de-
pends is the following (stated here, and proven in the Appendix).
Consider a joint system composed of subsystems A and B, which un-
dergoes Hamiltonian evolution between times t0 and t1. The total
Hamiltonian HAB may change during the process; changes may be
made to HA, corresponding to work done on the system, and to the
Hamiltonian of interaction between the two systems. We assume that
11It is essential to the theorem that the dynamics preserve phase-space volume. That this
condition is required to underwrite the second law is illustrated by Earman and Norton
(1999), who, building on the work of Skordos (1993) and Zhang and Zhang (1992), ex-
hibit a fictitious system with non-Hamiltonian, energy-conserving, time-reversal invariant
dynamics that completely converts heat drawn from a heat reservoir into work.
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at times t0 and t1 the total Hamiltonian is just the sum of the in-
ternal Hamiltonians HA and HB, and that HB(t1) = HB(t0). The
expectation value of the energy received by A from B is
〈Q〉 = −(〈HB〉t1 − 〈HB〉t0).
Suppose that the state ρAB at time t0 is one on which (i) B has
canonical distribution τβ, and (ii) A and B are uncorrelated. The
distribution of A at t0 is arbitrary.
Proposition 5. Under the stated conditions,
〈Q〉
T
≤ S[ρA(t1)]− S[ρA(t0)].
Proposition 5 holds for any Hamiltonian dynamics satisfying the
specified conditions, and so does not depend on any time-asymmetry
in the underlying dynamics. In fact, it holds regardless of whether t1 is
to the future or past of t0. The two times do not enter symmetrically
into the statement of the theorem, however. It is assumed that the
systems A and B are uncorrelated at t0, and this is not required to
hold at t1. That is the relevant difference between starting point and
ending point of the process considered.
It is sometimes said that the rationale for taking the initial state
of system + heat reservoir to be one without correlations between
them is that this has the status of a default assumption: statistical
or probabilistic independence is to be assumed in the absence of any
interaction that would create correlations. This is too quick. Among
the things that can create correlations between systems are events in
the common past of two systems. When we couple a system to a
heat reservoir, we are not assuming that there are no events in their
common past that could potentially lead to correlations.
What we are assuming is that the reservoir has thermalized, has
undergone a process of equilibration in the course of which details
of its past history, including previous interactions with the rest of
the world, have been effectively effaced. A detailed microdescription
might reveal some of these details, but it is expected that these will
be irrelevant at the macroscopic scale. To treat a system as a heat
reservoir is to treat the fine details of past interactions it might have
had with its environment as irrelevant to its subsequent behaviour.
The task of explaining how and why this happens is an interesting
and important one. The process produces thermal systems that the
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science of Θ∆cs can take to be available as resources for manipulations.
The study of equilibration is not, however, the province of Θ∆cs.12
The is a tendency to conflate the second law of thermodynamics
with the tendency of systems to relax to a state of thermal equilib-
rium, and this has encouraged the idea that the study of equilibration
does fall within the scope of thermodynamics. These are not the same
thing, however. The distinction can be made vivid by considering
the impact on the laws of thermo-dynamics of a “Loschmidt demon”
that could magically perform a velocity-reversal. Such a demon could
reverse equilibration of an isolated system, but its operations never-
theless fall within the scope of Proposition 2, and the second law of
Θ∆cs holds even if the stock of manipulations is expanded to included
velocity-reversal.
10 Conclusion
The chief differences between the theory whose outlines have been
sketched here, which I am calling thermo-dynamics, or Θ∆cs, and the
usual textbook presentations of thermodynamics, are two-fold. One
is that we have not assumed that all states are reversibly connectible.
Without this assumption, we do not have available a state-function S
such that SM(a → b) = SM(b) − SM(a). This is a relatively minor
point; with a little care, it is fairly easy to see that much of thermo-
dynamics goes through without this, and the advantage is that the
theory applies in regimes in which the inevitable dissipation involved
in every process is not taken to be negligible.
The more important difference is that, whereas the usual treat-
ments say that thermodynamic states are defined relative to a set of
variables deemed macroscopic, we have defined them in terms of a set
of variables deemed manipulable. I maintain that this is the best way
to make sense of the usual treatments, and that one will find, if one
reads closely, that the relevant variables are indeed being treated as
manipulable. For the most part, for the purposes of textbook exposi-
tion, as long as attention is confined to the macroscopic domain, and
we are not bent on pushing application of the theory into the meso-
scopic, it is perfectly acceptable to leave the class of manipulations
under consideration implicit. The danger of this, however, is that it
might tend to give the impression that entropy is a property of a sys-
12See Myrvold (2020) for further discussion of these points.
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tem, something that it has in and of itself, rather than being defined
relative to a class of manipulations.
Whether or not the reader agrees that Θ∆cs is the best way to
make sense of textbook presentations of thermodynamics and of ap-
plication of its concepts to the physical world, it should be noncontro-
versial that it is a legitimate subject. The usual objections to invoking
concepts such as manipulability tend to be of two (related) sorts. One
is that it brings in excessive subjectivity. The other is that concepts
of that sort are out of place in the study of equilibration. I hope that
I have satisfactorily addressed the former, in the preliminary discus-
sion of manipulability. The latter is met by a delimitation of scope.
Though Θ∆cs presumes the availability of systems that can be treated
as heat reservoirs, study of the process of thermalization does not fall
within its scope.
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12 Appendix
12.1 Proof of the Fundamental Theorem of
Statistical Thermo-dynamics
In this appendix we prove Proposition 2.
As before, ρ is used ambiguously for either a density function with
respect to Liouville measure on classical phase space, or a quantum
density operator. Hamiltonian evolution is, in the classical context,
evolution according to Hamilton’s equations of motion, and, in the
quantum context implemented by a family of unitary operators U(t).
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The letter S, without subscript, denotes either the Gibbs entropy or
the von Neumann entropy.
In the classical context, the salient fact about Hamiltonian evolution—
and, indeed, the only fact that we will use—is that Liouville measure
is invariant under evolution of that type. As a consequence, the expec-
tation value, with respect to Liouville measure Λ, of any measurable
function on phase space is invariant under Hamiltonian evolution; this
includes in particular the Gibbs entropy
SG[ρ] = −k〈ρ log ρ〉Λ. (32)
In the quantum context, the salient fact about Hamiltonian evo-
lution is that it conserves the inner product of two vectors in Hilbert
space. As a consequence, the trace of any operator is invariant; this
includes in particular the von Neumann entropy
SvN [ρˆ] = −kTr[ρˆ log ρˆ]. (33)
As conservation of phase space volume (classical) and absolute magni-
tude of inner product (quantum) are the only features of Hamiltonian
evolution used, we could expand our repertoire of operations to in-
clude fictitious operations, such as an instantaneous velocity reversal,
that retain these features, and the theorem would still go through.
The relevant facts about the Gibbs and von Neumann entropies
are:
1. Subadditivity. For a composite system AB,
S[ρAB ] ≤ S[ρA] + S[ρB ],
with equality if and only if the subsystems are probabilistically
independent.
2. For any T > 0, let β = 1/kT . The canonical distribution τβ
minimizes
〈H〉ρ − TS[ρ].
With these facts in hand, the proof of the theorem is easy. For
brevity, we will write SAB(t0) for S[ρAB(t0)], etc.. We will consider
only interactions with a single heat reservoir, as the extension to suc-
cessive interactions with multiple heat reservoirs is merely a matter of
repeated application of the theorem.
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The evolution from t0 to t1 does not change the joint entropy SAB .
At t0, since the systems are uncorrelated, SA + SB is at a minimum
for the value of SAB that obtains at both t0 and t1. Therefore,
SA(t0) + SB(t0) ≤ SA(t1) + SB(t1), (34)
or,
∆SA +∆SB ≥ 0. (35)
Since B has canonical distribution τβ at time t0,
〈HB〉t0 − TSB(t0) ≤ 〈HB〉t1 − TSB(t1), (36)
or,
∆〈HB〉 − T∆SB ≥ 0. (37)
This gives us,
〈Q〉 = −∆〈HB〉 ≤ −T∆SB. (38)
From (35),
−∆SB ≤ ∆SA, (39)
which, combined with (38), yields,
〈Q〉 ≤ T∆SA, (40)
or,
〈Q〉
T
≤ ∆SA, (41)
which is the desired result.
12.2 Some quotations from the history of Θ∆cs
The science that I am calling Θ∆cs is not a new idea. This under-
standing of the basic concepts of thermodynamics has been present
from the very beginning of the subject. In this appendix I provide
some relevant quotations, with no pretense to exhaustiveness.
Josiah Willard Gibbs (1875, pp. 228–229; in Gibbs 1906, pp. 166–
167). Part of this has already been quoted above; here is a fuller
quotation.
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When we say that when two different gases mix by diffusion as
we have supposed, the energy of the whole remains constant, and the
entropy receives a certain increase, we mean that the gases could be
separated and brought to the same volume and temperature which
they had at first by means of a certain change in external bodies, for
example, by the passages of a certain amount of heat from a warmer
to a colder body. But when we say that when two gas-masses of the
same kind are mixed under similar circumstances there is no change
of energy or entropy, we do not mean that the gases which have been
mixed can be separated without change to external bodies. On the
contrary, the separation of the gases is entirely impossible. We call
the energy and entropy of the gas-masses when mixed the same as
when they were unmixed, because we do not recognize any difference
in the substance of the two masses. So when gases of different kinds
are mixed, if we ask what changes in external bodies are necessary
to bring the system to its original state, we do not mean a state
in which each particle shall occupy more or less exactly the same
position as at some previous epoch, but only a state which shall be
undistinguishable from the previous one in its sensible properties. It
is to states of systems thus incompletely defined that the problems of
thermodynamics relate.
But if such considerations explain the mixture of gas-masses of the
same kind stands on a different footing from the mixture of gas-masses
of different kinds, the fact is not less significant that the increase of
entropy due to the mixture of gases of different kinds, in such a case
as we have supposed, is independent of the nature of the gases.
Now we may say without violence to the general laws of gases which
are embodied in our equations suppose other gases to exist than such
as actually do exist, and there does not appear to be any limit to
the resemblance which there might be between two such kinds of gas.
But the increase of entropy due to the mixing of given volumes of the
gases at a given temperature and pressure would be independent of
the degree of similarity or dissimilarity between them. We might also
imagine the case of two gases which should be absolutely identical in
all the properties (sensible and molecular) which come into play while
they exist as gases either pure or mixed with each other, but which
should differ in respect to the attractions between their atoms and
the atoms of some other substances, and therefore in their tendency
to combine with other substances. In the mixture of such gases by
diffusion an increase of entropy would take place, although the process
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of mixture, dynamically considered, might be absolutely identical in
its minutest details (even with respect to the precise path of each
atom) with processes which might take place without any increase
of entropy. In such respects, entropy stands strongly contrast with
energy.
Rudolf Clausius (1877, p. 32). Responding to P. G. Tait’s (unfair)
charge that the fact that the possibility of a demon that could, with-
out expenditure of work, cool a body below the temperature of its
surroundings “is absolutely fatal to Clausius’ reasoning,” (Tait 1876,
pp. 118-120; see also Tait 1877, p. 37), Clausius wrote,
Dieses kann ich in keiner Weise zugeben. Wenn die Wa¨rme als
eine Molecularbewegung betrachtet wird, so ist dabei zu bedenken,
dass die Molecu¨le so kleine Ko¨rpertheilchen sind, dass es fu¨r uns
unmo¨glich ist, sie einzeln wahrzunehmen. Wir ko¨nnen daher nicht auf
einzelne Molecu¨le fu¨r sich allein wirken, oder die Wirkungen einzelner
Molecu¨le fu¨r sich allein erhalten, sondern haben es bei jeder Wirk-
ung, welche wir auf einen Ko¨rper ausu¨ben oder von ihm erhalten,
gleichzeitig mit einer ungeheuer grossen Menge von Molecu¨len zu thun,
welche sich nach allen mo¨glichen Richtungen und mit allein u¨berhaupt
bei den Molecu¨len vorkommenden Geschwindigkeiten bewegen, und
sich an der Wirkung in der Weise gleichma¨ssig betheiligen, dass nur
zufa¨llige Verschiedenheiten vorkommen, die den allgemeinen Gesetzen
der Wahrscheinlichkeit unterworfen sind. Dieser Umstand bildet ger-
ade die charakteristische Eigenthu¨mlichkeit derjenigen Bewegung, welche
wir Wa¨rme nennen, und auf ihm beruhen die Gesetze, welche das Ver-
halten der Wa¨rme von dem anderer Bewegungen unterscheiden.
Wenn nun Da¨monen eingreifen, und diese charakteristische Eigen-
thu¨mlichkeit zersto¨ren, indem sie unter den Molecu¨len einen Unter-
schied machen, und Molecu¨len von gewissen Geschwindigkeiten den
Durchgang durch eine Scheidewand gestatten, Molecu¨len von anderen
Geschwindigkeiten dagegen den Durchgang verwehren, so darf man
das, was unter diesen Umsta¨nden geschieht, nicht mehr als eine Wirk-
ung der Wa¨rme ansehen und erwarten, dass es mit den fu¨r die Wirk-
ungen der Wa¨rme geltenden Gesetzen u¨bereinstimmt.
This I can in no way concede. If heat is regarded as a molecular
motion, it should be remembered that the molecules are parts of bodies
that are so small that it is impossible for us to perceive them indi-
vidually. We can therefore not act on single molecules by themselves,
38
or obtain effect from individual molecules by themselves, but rather,
in every action that we exert on a body or receive from it, we have
simultaneously to do with an immensely large collection of molecules,
which move in all possible directions and with all the speeds occurring
among the molecules, and participate in the action uniformly, in such
a way that there occur only random differences, which are subject to
the general laws of probability. This circumstance forms precisely the
characteristic property of that motion which we call heat, and on it
depends the laws that distinguish the behavior of heat from that of
other motions.
If now demons intervene, and disturb this characteristic property
by distinguishing between the molecules, and molecules of certain
speeds are permitted passage through a partition, molecules of other
speeds refused passage, then one may no longer regard what happens
under these conditions as an action of heat and expect it to agree with
the laws valid for the action of heat.
James Clerk Maxwell
Available energy is energy which we can direct into any desired
channel. Dissipated energy is energy we cannot lay hold of and direct
at pleasure, such as the energy of the confused agitation of molecules
which we call heat. Now, confusion, like the correlative term order, is
not a property of material things in themselves, but only in relation
to the mind which perceives them. A memorandum-book does not,
provided it is neatly written, appear confused to an illiterate person,
or to the owner who understands thoroughly, but to any other person
able to read it appears to be inextricably confused. Similarly the
notion of dissipated energy could not occur to a being who could not
turn any of the energies of nature to his own account, or to one who
could trace the motion of every molecule and seize it at the right
moment. It is only to a being in the intermediate stage, who can lay
hold of some forms of energy while others elude his grasp, that energy
appears to be passing inevitably from the available to the dissipated
state (1877, p. 221, in Niven 1890, p. 646).
The second law relates to that kind of communication of energy
which we call the transfer of heat as distinguished from another kind
of communication of energy which we call work. According to the
molecular theory the only difference between these two kinds of com-
munication of energy is that the motions and displacements which
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are concerned in the communication of heat are those of molecules,
and are so numerous, so small individually, and so irregular in their
distribution, that they quite escape all our methods of observation;
whereas when the motions and displacements are those of visible bod-
ies consisting of great numbers of molecules moving altogether, the
communication of energy is called work.
Hence we have only to suppose our senses sharpened to such a
degree that we could trace the motions of molecules as easily as we
now trace those of large bodies, and the distinction between work and
heat would vanish, for the communication of heat would be seen to
be a communication of energy of the same kind as that which we call
work. (1878, p. 279, in Niven 1890, p. 669).
John von Neumann (1929)
If we take into account that the observer can measure only macro-
scopically then we find different entropy values (in fact, greater ones,
as the observer is now less skilful and possibly can therefore extract
less mechanical work from the system) . . . . (von Neumann 2010, p.
214, from von Neumann 1929, p. 47).
Harold Grad (1961, pp. 326–27).
Whether or not a diffusion occurs when a barrier is removed de-
pends not on a difference in physical properties of the two substances
but on a decision that we are or are not interested in such a differ-
ence (which is what governs the choice of an entropy function) . . . A
very illuminating example is given by the “spin-echo” effect. In this
experiment, it is found that it is possible to produce a highly ordered
microscopic state and, at a later time, effectively reverse all veloci-
ties. To a person who has access to such equipment, a very high level
“reversible” entropy will be appropriate; to one who has not, a lower
order entropy will properly describe all phenomena.
Nicolaas Godfried van Kampen (1984, pp. 306–307). In regards
to the difference in expression of entropies for a uniform sample of gas
and a system composed of two different gases, van Kampen wrote,
The origin of the difference is that two different processes had to
be chosen for extending the definition of entropy. They are mutually
exclusive; the first one cannot be used for two different gases and the
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second one does not apply to a single gas. But suppose that A and
B are so similar that the experimenter has no physical way of distin-
guishing between them. Then he does not have the semi-permeable
walls needed for the second process, but on the other hand the first
will look reversible to him. . . . The point is, that this is perfectly jus-
tified and that he will not be led to any wrong results. If you tell
him that ‘actually’ the entropy increased when he opened the channel
he will answer that this is a useless statement since he cannot utilize
the entropy increase for running a machine. The entropy increase is
no more physical to him than the one that could be manufactured by
taking a single gas an mentally tagging the molecules by A or B.
In fact, this still holds when the experimenter would be able to
distinguish between A and B, by means of a mass spectrograph for
instance, but is not interested in the difference because it is not rel-
evant for his purpose. This is precisely what engineers do when they
make tables of the entropy of steam, ignoring the fact that it is actually
a mixture of normal and heavy water. Thus, whether such a process is
reversible or not depends on how discriminating the observer is. The
expression for the entropy (which one constructs by one or the other
processes mentioned above) depends on whether he is able and will-
ing to distinguish between the molecules A and B. This is a paradox
only for those who attach more physical reality to the entropy than is
implied by its definition.
Edward T. Jaynes (1992, p. 5).
In the first place, it is necessary to decide at the outset of a prob-
lem which macroscopic variables or degrees of freedom we shall mea-
sure and/or control; and within the context of the thermodynamic
system thus defined, entropy will be some function S(X1, . . . ,Xn) of
whatever variables we have chosen. We expect this to obey the sec-
ond law TdS ≥ dQ only as long as all experimental manipulations
are confined to that chosen set. If someone, unknown to us, were to
vary a macrovariable Xn+1 outside that set, he could produce what
would appear to us as a violation of the second law, since our en-
tropy function S(X1, . . . ,Xn) might decrease spontaneously, while his
S(X1, . . . ,Xn,Xn+1) increases.
John Goold, Marcus Huber, Arnau Riera, L´ıdia del Rio, and
Paul Skrzypczyk (2016, pp. 1–2).
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If physical theories were people, thermodynamics would be the
village witch. Over the course of three centuries, she smiled quietly
as other theories rose and withered, surviving major revolutions in
physics, like the advent of general relativity and quantum mechan-
ics. The other theories find her somewhat odd, somehow different
in nature from the rest, yet everyone comes to her for advice, and
no-one dares to contradict her. Einstein, for instance, called her ‘the
only physical theory of universal content, which I am convinced, that
within the framework of applicability of its basic concepts will never
be overthrown.’
Her power and resilience lay mostly on her frank intentions: ther-
modynamics has never claimed to be a means to understand the mys-
teries of the natural world, but rather a path towards efficient ex-
ploitation of said world. She tells us how to make the most of some
resources, like a hot gas or a magnetized metal, to achieve specific
goals, be them moving a train or formatting a hard drive. Her uni-
versality comes from the fact that she does not try to understand the
microscopic details of particular systems. Instead, she only cares to
identify which operations are easy and hard to implement in those
systems, and which resources are freely available to an experimenter,
in order to quantify the cost of state transformations.
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